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1 Introduction
Tartu University has decided that in order to make things more convenient for users
their eduroam usernames and passwords will match those of other UT services such
as ÕIS. However, convenience often comes at the expense of security. This research
was conducted in order to determine whether this merge of passwords has an
impact on security, with the aim to identify any potential attacks. During research
different attack vectors were considered and tested. An attack was discovered
which allows an attacker to gain access to the University of Tartu's Samba servers
by exploiting the authentication protocols used in eduroam and UT's Samba server.
This attack allows the attacker to gain access to any files shared with the user
whose credentials were captured, including their UT home folder. Additionally,
the attacker gains the user's NT Hash, which can then be used to potentially
uncover the user's password. Details about unsuccessful attack vectors are not
included in this thesis.
The first section contains details about eduroam as well as the protocols used
in the attack. The eduroam subsection describes requirements set on its member
universities and the infrastructure of the confederation itself. The following sub-
sections outline the Extensible Authentication Protocol, an authentication frame-
work required by eduroam; PEAP, the authentication protocol used in the UT
eduroam configuration; MS-CHAPv2, the inner authentication protocol used in
PEAP which is the root of the discovered attack; and NTLM, an authentication
protocol currently in use in University of Tartu's Samba servers.
The second section contains details about the uncovered attack, beginning with
a brief overview. The first subsection describes the process of setting up a rogue
access point, which is used to capture the authentication handshake of the user.
This subsection also details how different operating systems behave in different
scenarios in the presence of this rogue access point. The second subsections de-
scribes the difficulty of brute forcing the aforementioned block cipher, a necessary
process in this attack. The third subsection briefly explains Samba and demon-
strates how to authenticate to University of Tartu's Samba using the password
hash gained from previous subsections. The fourth and final subsection outlines
different methods which can be used to improve the security of eduroam against
this attack.
The third section contains the results of the thesis and their affect on Tartu
University.
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2 Background
2.1 Overview of eduroam
Eduroam, short for EDUcation ROAMing, is a service which allows users from
participating academic institutions to gain secure internet access while visiting
another participating academic institution [MM12]. The eduroam Policy Service
Definition describes the goal eduroam user experience as "open your laptop and
be online". Eduroam is based on the concept that in order to gain internet access
in the university that the user is visiting, the authentication to the local network
is carried out in the user's home institution using the home institution's specified
authentication methods.
Eduroam is based on a hierarchial tree of Remote Authentication Dial-In User
Service (RADIUS) servers, which manage the authentication of users. The tree's
hierarchy allows the visiting user's authentication request to be routed to its
home institution's RADIUS server. Users are given usernames in the form of
name@realm where "realm" usually corresponds to the DNS domain name of the
user's home institute. The institute's domain name is used to route the request
within the tree. The leafs of the tree are the institutions' RADIUS servers. Those
servers are connected to a national RADIUS server which in turn is connected to
a European or global RADIUS server. As eduroam uses the country code portion
of the domain name for routing, generic top-level-domain realms (such as in the
case of user@terenas.org), where the user's country is impossible to determine, are
handled as special cases and their use must be specifically requested. Figure 1
displays the different layers of the hierarchy with four institutes in two countries.
Figure 1: Layers of the eduroam RADIUS hierarchy [gro08].
The following describes the process where a user, who is visiting another insti-
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tute within the confederation, authenticates to the local network via eduroam [Net].
• The user's device signals the authenticator, usually a wireless access point,
that it wishes to access the internet.
• The authenticator signals the user that it wishes to initiate an Extensible
Authentication Protocol (EAP) conversation.
• The user's response is forwarded by the authenticator to the local RADIUS
server, where it is additionally forwarded along the eduroam network of RA-
DIUS servers until it reaches the user's home university's RADIUS server.
• An encrypted connection is established between the user and the user's home
university's RADIUS server.
• An EAP conversation is carried out.
• Once authentication via EAP is successful, the authenticator is notified. It
then starts a handshake with the user to initiate the flow of encrypted wireless
traffic.
Eduroam currently requires the use of EAP-TLS, EAP-TTLS or PEAP as end-
to-end encryption support is required from each participating institution. This
requirement is put in place to ensure that eduroam infrastructure operators are
unable to steal the digital identities of users. In addition to requiring end-to-
end encryption, eduroam also requires the participating institutions to provide
technical data about the service, provide a user-support service to end users, and
maintain a website which features a guide in English on how to use eduroam. While
there are some technical specifications which the eduroam confederation requires
institutions to follow, there are no other restrictions set in terms of authentication
methods other than requiring the use of EAP-TLS, EAP-TTLS or PEAP.
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2.2 Extensible Authentication Protocol
EAP
EAP, short for Extensible Authentication Protocol, is an authentication frame-
work described in RFC-3748, which specifies different message formats to be used
in protocols [Lev04]. Unlike previous Point-to-point protocols, where an authenti-
cation mechanism is chosen during the initial link establishment phase, in EAP an
authentication mechanism is chosen in the authentication phase [Mic08]. These
authentication methods are known as EAP methods. Once a method has been
chosen, the peer and the authenticator begin an EAP conversation, which varies
in length and format depending on the chosen EAP method. By the end of the
conversation, the authenticator must transmit either an EAP Success (Code 3)
message or an EAP Failure (Code 4) message.
The extensibility of EAP stems from its methods. To add a new EAP authen-
tication method, both the authenticator and the peer only need to install an EAP
method library file. The Internet Assigned Numbers Authority has specified over
40 EAP methods while new methods, such as EAP-Kerberos, are currently being
drafted [Aut15, Rei16].
As EAP is a framework, not a protocol, there are several standards which
define the encapsulation of EAP messages on different kinds of media. The IEEE
802.1x standard defines the encapsulation of EAP over LAN networks and the
802.11i standard defines EAP for wireless LAN's [Lev04, Abo05]. Use of EAP in
conjunction with a pre-shared key is also referred to as WPA2-Enterprise [Sys08].
PEAP
EAP was designed for wired networks, which assumed physical security [Jos03].
As a result of this, EAP has no measures with which to protect the EAP conver-
sation from attackers in cases where access to the medium is possible, such as
over wireless media or IP. Furthermore, EAP Success and Failure packets are not
authenticated, which means they can be forged by an attacker. Forged EAP Fail-
ure packets can then be used to force EAP peers to disconnect from the network.
Forged EAP Success packets can be used by an attacker to convince a peer to
connect to its network. To solve this issue, Cisco, Microsoft, and RSA Security
developed PEAP, a protocol which encapsulates EAP within a TLS tunnel, which
protects the EAP conversation by encrypting it and providing defense against
spoofed Success/Failure packets by transmitting them within TLS.
In the following description, the term "peer" refers to a network access client
and the term "server" refers to the authentication server, which is typically a
RADIUS server [Mic15]. The network access point only relays messages between
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the server and the peer and, if the server sends the appropriate message to the
access point, initiates the handshake with the user to begin encrypted wireless
traffic.
PEAP consists of two parts. The first stage establishes the TLS tunnel between
the peer and the server. PEAP requires the server to have a server certificate to
establish this connection. Client-side certificates are not required, which makes
PEAP more convenient to use. Once a key has been negotiated, it is used to en-
crypt the rest of the conversation between the authenticator and the peer. Within
the tunnel begins stage two, where a new EAP conversation is started for authen-
tication, unless the peer had used a client-side certificate in the first stage. This
process is illustrated by figure 2. This EAP conversation is carried out until the
user is authenticated. EAP Extensions TLV - Success messages are exchanged
within the tunnel to securely verify the success of the authentication, cleartext
EAP Success messages can be tampered with.
While PEAP supports many inner authentication methods, MSCHAPv2 is by
far the most common one [CB12]. The inner authentication method is chosen
by a negotiation process. The server offers the peer an authentication method
which the peer can either accept or refuse. If the peer accepts a method which the
server suggested and supports, it will be used [Sys]. Otherwise, the authentication
attempt will be cancelled by the server.
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Figure 2: An example of a successful PEAP authentication [Mic15].
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2.3 MSCHAPv2
2.3.1 Overview of MSCHAPv2
The Challenge-Handshake Authentication Protocol (CHAP) was created as a way
to verify the identify of users by using a three-way handshake [Sim96]. The hand-
shake would require both parties to generate responses which are based upon a
secret, which has been previously shared and stored in plain. The advantage of
this method is that neither party broadcasts the secret during authentication.
The general steps of the Challenge-Handshake Authentication Protocol are as fol-
lows [Sim96].
• The authenticator sends a unique and unpredictable "challenge" message to
the peer.
• The peer generates a value based on the shared secret and the received
"challenge" message. It then sends it to the authenticator.
• The authenticator generates a value based on the shared secret and the
"challenge" message. It then compares the value it generated to the one
it received from the peer. If the values match, then the authentication is
acknowledged and the authenticator sends a "success" packet.
In 1998, Microsoft released their own version of the CHAP protocol, named
MS-CHAP, which allowed the authenticator to use hashes of the user's password
instead of storing plaintext passwords [Cob98]. In 2000, an improved version
was released and named MS-CHAPv2 which also provided mutual authentication,
meaning that the authenticator's knowledge of the secret was required for a suc-
cessful handshake. This was achieved by adding a "challenge" message sent by the
peer alongside its "Response" packet and bundling the authenticator's response
along with its "Success" packet [Zor00]. MS-CHAPv2 is still used to this day as
the most common PEAP authentication method [CB12].
The MSCHAPv2 protocol works as follows [Zor00]:
• The authenticator generates a random 16-byte "Authenticator-Challenge"
and transmits it to the peer.
• The peer generates a 16-byte "Peer-Challenge".
• The peer generates a "ChallengeHash" by hashing the concatenation of the
"Peer-Challenge", the "Authenticator-Challenge", and the username. The
hashing is done using the Secure Hash Algorithm 1 (SHA1).
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• The peer generates a 16-byte NTHash of the user's password, which is the
MD4 hash of the user's password in unicode.
• The peer pads the NTHash with zeroes to 21 bytes. The peer then splits this
padded 21-byte block into three 7-byte blocks which will be used as three
DES keys. The peer creates a "ChallengeResponse" by encrypting the "Chal-
lengeHash" using the DES algorithm with the three keys and concatenating
the results.
• The peer then sends the authenticator the "ChallengeResponse", the "Chal-
lengeHash", the "Peer-Challenge", and the username. Figure 3 illustrates
the steps described up to this point.
Figure 3: The generation of the ChallengeResponse [Mar12].
• The authenticator checks "ChallengeResponse" against the expected result.
If they match, the authenticator will begin to generate the response that is
required for mutual authentication.
• The authenticator hashes the NTHash of the user's password once more,
creating a "PasswordHashHash".
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• The authenticator hashes the "PasswordHashHash", the "ChallengeResponse",
and a certain constant to create a "Digest". This hashing is done using SHA1
• The authenticator generates another hash called "AuthenticatorResponse"
with the SHA1 function, using a concatenation of the "Digest", the "Peer-
Challenge", and another constant. The generation of the "AuthenticatorRe-
sponse" is illustrated by figure 4.
• 20 bytes of the "AuthenticatorResponse" are sent to the peer in the form of
"S=", followed by 40 ASCII hexadecimal digits of "AuthenticatorResponse".
Figure 4: The generation of the AuthenticatorResponse [Mar12].
• The client then verifies the identity of the authenticator by replicating the
above steps and comparing the result to the "AuthenticatorResponse".
2.3.2 DES and vulnerability in MSCHAPv2
The Data Encryption Standard (DES) algorithm used in MS-CHAPv2 is a block
cipher which uses a single 7-byte key to both encrypt and decrypt 8-byte blocks
of data into 8 bytes of ciphertext [Bur]. It was developed by IBM with the aid of
the NSA and published in January of 1977 as a Federal Information Processing
Standard for the United States [Int, Joh98, oST].
The DES became the most widely used encryption algorithm, both in com-
mercial use and as a target of a generation of cryptanalysts. The DES proved
12
to be resilient against cryptanalytic attacks, but is now considered insecure since
advancements in technology have made a brute force attack against a 7-byte key
possible [Bur]. On June 18th 1997, the DESCHALL project successfully cracked
a DES-encrypted message with the help of thousands of Internet users who per-
formed a coordinated search of the key space which lasted three months [MC98].
With the use of specialized hardware, the time required for a brute-force attack
was reduced to mere days in 1998 [Fou98a, Fou98b]. This specialized hardware
consisted of a normal personal computer, which was connected to about 1500
custom-made "Deep-Crack" chips. These chips were designed to dismiss a large
amount of incorrect keys in parallel, reducing the amount of potential keys to a
fraction of the original key space. Software in the personal computer coordinated
the chips and checked the small amount of undiscarded keys for the right one.
In July 2012, a man going by the pseudonym Moxie Marlinspike published
an article for cracking MS-CHAPv2 by using a single search of the DES key
space [Mar12]. The reason this is possible is that everything that the peer needs
for authentication is transmitted, with the exception of the NTHash of the user's
password. Figure 5 illustrates this by coloring the values which are not sent as
red.
Since the unknown NT hash was only 16 bytes, it had to be padded with zeroes
to 21 bytes. Then it was used as the basis for three DES keys, which encrypted the
"ChallengeHash" into three ciphertexts. Those ciphertexts were then concatenated
to form the "ChallengeResponse". Since both the "ChallengeResponse" and the
"ChallengeHash" are sent from the peer to the authenticator, it is possible to find
the three DES keys which were used to transform the "ChallengeHash" to parts
of the "ChallengeResponse". By concatenating the keys, the attacker would then
gain the NT hash of the user. As the third key only contains two significant bytes
with the rest padded with zeroes, it takes very little time to find the right key.
Finding the first and second keys is possible by iterating over the DES key space
and encrypting the ChallengeHash with each key. The resulting ciphertext is then
compared to the appropriate sections of the "ChallengeResponse", meaning that
both keys will be retrieved without any additional DES operations compared to
cracking just one key [Mar12]. With the increase in computing power since the late
90's, cracking DES has become much more affordable - Moxie Marlinspike provides
a service named "Cloudcracker", which claims to perform this very attack within
21 hours for the price of 100 dollars [Int16]. This claim is, however, unverified.
As of May 11th 2016, Cloudcracker is oine whereas it had been online in March
2016. It is unclear if the service is experiencing temporary difficulties or if the
project has been cancelled.
As the peer is authenticated before the authenticator, anyone who attempts
to connect to a rogue authenticator using MS-CHAPv2 is therefore providing the
13
Figure 5: The unknowns of generating the ChallengeResponse [Mar12].
attacker with everything needed to recover their NTHash. Once the NTHash is
retrieved, the attacker can then
• use it to authenticate to the MS-CHAPv2 network as the user;
• use it to perform the second authentication of MS-CHAPv2, appearing to the
user as a legitimate network, and thus perform a man-in-the-middle attack;
• use the NTHash in other services which require it for authentication.
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2.4 NTLM
Note: Reading this section is only required to fully understand why access to the
NT hash allows authentication to the UT Samba service.
NTLM, short for NT Lan Manager, is a challenge-response authentication pro-
tocol used in Windows [Cor15]. Since the Windows 2000 Server operating system,
the Kerberos authentication protocol replaces NTLM as the preferred authenti-
cation method. Despite that, NTLM support is still maintained for instances in
which Kerberos is not suitable, for example if the server is not joined to a domain.
As NTLM does not support recent cryptographic methods, Microsoft has advised
applications to not use NTLM [HK97].
NTLM has several different versions - LM (Lan Manager), NTLMv1, NTLMv2
and NTLMv2 session. NTLMv2 session provides the option of extended session
security, which provides message integrity and confidentiality. However, it is a
misnomer as the protocol itself is NTLMv1 using the session security features which
are also present in plain NTLMv2. To allow hosts to determine a minimum level of
security, 6 different authentication levels have been specified. As the LM protocol
does not use the user's NT hash to generate the challenge response packet, the
specifics of generating LM response with a one way function will not be described.
2.4.1 Challenge response in NTLMv1
In NTLM, both an NT challenge response and an LM challenge response is sent.
Depending on the security level, the LM response may not be required. In the
NTLMv1 protocol, these responses for a non-anonymous client are generated as
follows:
• Similarly to MSCHAPv2, the NT hash is padded with five zeroes and then
split into three DES keys.
• If extended session security is enabled, the plaintext is set to the first 8 bytes
of the MD5 hash of the concatenation of the 8-byte ServerChallenge and
a random 8-byte ClientChallenge. This is then encrypted with the three
DES keys with the results concatenated, resulting in a 24-byte NT challenge
response. The LM challenge response is just set to a concatenation of the
8-byte client challenge and a 16-byte pad of zeroes.
• If extended session security is not enabled, the plaintext is simply the 8-
byte ServerChallenge. It is then encrypted with the three DES keys and
the concatenation of the ciphertexts becomes the 24-byte NT response. The
LM challenge response is either calculated or set to the NT response value,
depending on whether or not the value was required.
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Figure 6 visualizes the described process. Note that if the LM challenge re-
sponse is not required, the NT hash of the user is sufficient to generate the LM
and NT responses.
2.4.2 Challenge response in NTLMv2
In NTLMv2, the NT and LM challenge responses are generated as follows:
• The 1-byte identifier of the response version, the 1-byte identifier of the
highest possible response version, a 6-byte pad, the 8-byte little-endian GMT
time, the 8-byte random client challenge, a 4-byte pad, the server name
received from a previous packet, and another 4-byte pad are all concatenated
to form a value labelled "temp".
• A HMAC-MD5 algorithm is used on the concatenation of the unicode up-
percase username and the user's domain. The key for this operation is the
NT hash of the user's password. This allows the server to check the integrity
of the hash with the use of a shared secret key [HK97]. This value is named
the ResponseKey.
• The server challenge and "temp" are then concatenated and then hashed
using the HMAC-MD5 algorithm, with ResponseKey as the key. The NT
response is the result of concatenating "temp" to the end of the 16-byte hash.
• The 8-byte server challenge and 8-byte client challenge are concatenated and
hashed with the HMAC-MD5 algorithm, with ResponseKey as the key. The
client challenge is concatenated to the end of the resulting hash. The result
is the LM response.
Figure 7 visualizes the described process. Note that the NT hash of the user
is sufficient to generate the LM and NT responses.
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Figure 6: Generating the NT and LM responses in NTLMv1 [Cor15].
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Figure 7: Generating the NT and LM responses in NTLMv2 [Cor15].
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3 Using Tartu University's eduroam configuration
to gain access to user files
Tartu University's eduroam uses a PEAP-MSCHAPv2 configuration. Multiple
guides provided by the university on how to connect to eduroam also currently in-
struct students and faculty to configure their devices so that the PEAP server-side
certificates are not validated [Kal16a, Kal16b, RK16]. When asked to comment,
Erkki Kukk, a University of Tartu employee who was originally tasked with setting
up eduroam in UT 10 years ago, stated the following: "We had to find balance
between security and usability. In windows 2000, XP and 7 and maybe some
other operating systems too you first had to have internet connection in order
to download and install radius server certificate to the client machine. Since its
world-wide project we also followed other institutions guides. I think for those
reasons we decided to uncheck the certificate verification." However, this creates
a potential weakness, as clients who do not validate certificates and attempt to
connect to a spoofed access point will provide an attacker with everything required
to retrieve the NT hash of the user's password. This section describes an attack
in which:
• the attacker creates a spoofed access point in order to capture the authenti-
cation reponse of the user;
• the attacker retrieves the NT hash of the user based on the captured authen-
tication response;
• the attacker authenticates to the university's Samba server using the re-
trieved NT hash.
The section also contains a subsection which contains suggestions on how to
improve the security of Tartu University's eduroam configuration and reduce the
threat of this attack.
3.1 Setting up a rogue access point
If server certificate validation is disabled, identifying networks becomes a lot more
difficult, as there are very few variables that the client can use to distinguish net-
works from one another. In NetworkManager, a network configuration tool used
in several widely used linux distributions such as Debian, Ubuntu and Fedora,
the only things that distinguish unverified networks from one another are the net-
work's ID and its authentication method [The16]. An example of the details saved
by NetworkManager can be seen in appendix A. To successfully impersonate a
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legitimate UT eduroam access point, the attacker's network needs to use PEAP-
MSCHAPv2 and use the id "eduroam". To use EAP authentication, the attacker
must set up a RADIUS server with which the client will communicate. As the
MSCHAPv2 exchange in PEAP is encrypted in a TLS tunnel, extracting the re-
quired information would prove difficult without the help of specialized software.
FreeRADIUS-WPE, a patch of the open-source RADIUS server software FreeRA-
DIUS, provides a solution for this issue [Ant, Pro]. In the following examples,
FreeRADIUS-WPE 2.1.12 is used.
If FreeRADIUS-WPE is installed, any authentication attempts will be visible
in /usr/local/var/log/radius/freeradius-server-wpe.log. For example, a client with
the username "test" and password "test" attempting to authenticate using PEAP-
MSCHAPv2 will appear in the logs as follows:
mschap : Sun May 8 22 : 01 : 56 2016
username : t e s t
cha l l eng e : d5 : 0 7 : 1 2 : 0 0 : 8 2 : 5 e : df : 44
re sponse : 0 4 : 6 4 : 8 9 : 9 7 : 2 9 : 6 b : 5 c : eb : 8 6 : d3 : e1 : 6 5 : fd : 0 9 : 8 d : b1 : 9 2 : 1 c
: 5 9 : 2 1 : 6 d : d0 : ed : ab
john NETNTLM: t e s t :
$NETNTLM$d5071200825edf44$04648997296b5ceb86d3e165fd098db1921
c59216dd0edab
Tests were ran to see how different operating systems behaved in the presence of
rogue access points. This is designed to simulate an attack in which the attacker
brings a rogue access point into the legitimate university network. In order to
perform this in a controlled environment, two RADIUS servers were set up with
two access points - one to signify the university's eduroam network and one to
signify the attacker's access point.
A wireless access point was set up and connected to a RADIUS server running
FreeRADIUS 2.2.8 on Lubuntu 16.04. This access point is henceforth referred to
as RAD-LEG and it signifies the UT eduroam network. A wireless access point
was set up and connected to a RADIUS server running FreeRADIUS-WPE 2.1.12
on debian 8 (jessie). This access point is henceforth referred to as RAD-ROG
and it signifies the attacker's access point. Both access points were set to broad-
cast a network called "eduroam-test" with the PEAP-MSCHAPv2 authentication
protocol.
A test account was set up by appending the following to /etc/freeradius/users:
t e s t u s e r Cleartext Password :="eduroampassword"
To configure PEAP-MSCHAPv2 on RAD-LEG, "default_eap_type = peap" was
set in the eap section of /etc/freeradius/eap.conf. In order for the access point to
access the RADIUS server, it needs to be configured in /etc/freeradius/clients.conf.
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To do so, the IP address and a secret between the access point and the RADIUS
server were specified as follows:
c l i e n t <AP IP> {
ipaddr = <AP IP>
s e c r e t = <s e c r e t phrase>
nastype = other
}
Similar configuration was performed on RAD-ROG. Note that the RADIUS
root folder on RAD-ROG is /usr/local/etc/raddb instead of /etc/freeradius as it
uses a different version of FreeRADIUS.
3.1.1 Windows 10
By default, Windows 10 attempts to validate server-side certificates. The guides
on the UT wiki site actively disable this feature. The following section describes
different authentication use cases under the Windows 10 operating system.
In cases where
• the user has never connected to eduroam;
• the user has not configured the network using the UT guide;
• both RAD-ROG and RAD-LEG are in range;
only the access point with a stronger signal is displayed. If the user connects by
double-clicking on the network, there will be an unverified certificate warning re-
gardless of which access point is closest. Figure 8 illustrates the certificate warning
displayed in Windows 10. If the strongest access point happens to be RAD-ROG,
it is possible for the rogue access point to request that the inner authentication
method would be PAP instead of MSCHAPv2, an insecure protocol which would
give the attacker access to the user's password in plaintext.
In cases where
• the user has connected to eduroam previously;
• the user did not follow the UT guide and simply selected the legitimate
eduroam access point correctly on their first connection;
• both RAD-ROD and RAD-LEG are in range;
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Figure 8: A Windows 10 certificate warning.
only the access point with a stronger signal is displayed. If the strongest ac-
cess point happens to be RAD-LEG, everything will proceed without interrup-
tion and the user will connect to the legitimate network. If the strongest access
point happens to be RAD-ROG, a certificate warning will be displayed. If the
user dismisses the warning, the device will authenticate with RAD-ROG and the
MSCHAPv2 handshake is retrieved. Note that the user is unable to access RAD-
LEG and RAD-ROG is their only option, meaning the attacker either gains the
MSCHAPv2 handshake or successfully performs a denial of service attack.
In cases where
• the user is connected to RAD-LEG;
• the user enters into an area where RAD-ROG has stronger signal than RAD-
LEG;
• the user's device loses signal to RAD-LEG, causing reconnect attempts;
the device will attempt to connect to RAD-ROG. However, as RAD-ROG's certifi-
cate does not match, the PEAP-MSCHAPv2 authentication ends before the inner
MSCHAPv2 stage. The user is left without a connection as they cannot reconnect
to RAD-LEG.
In cases where
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• the user has configured their network using the UT guide;
• both RAD-LEG and RAD-ROG are in range.
In these scenarios it does not matter whether the user is connecting for the first
time or not. Whenever there is a connection being established, the access point
with the strongest signal is chosen. There are never any certificate warnings dis-
played.
Note that even without connecting to a third-party Certificate Authority, the
certificates are stored in the user's computer and thus the device is able to tell
whether or not the user is trying to connect to a different network than normal
and displays a warning accordingly. Following the UT guides in this case is less
secure. However, this warning is most likely easily dismissed by users. For details,
see "Validating the server certificate" paragraph on page 25.
3.1.2 Linux
Tests similar to the Windows 10 tests were ran using the Lubuntu 15.10 operat-
ing system with NetworkManager 1.0.4, abbreviated as NM. The key difference
between Windows 10 and NM is that NM by default does not attempt to vali-
date certificates. Therefore in cases where the user does not manually configure
the certificate (meaning both default and UT-specified configuration), the device
will always attempt to authenticate to whichever access point is nearest. In cases
where the user does manually configure the server certificate, NM will not display
a warning when the certificates do not match. The authentication attempt will
then be stopped before the inner authentication method begins. Also, if the user
is connecting for the first time, a prompt will be displayed which allows the user
to specify the inner authentication method used in PEAP, with MSCHAPv2 being
the default. This avoids the problem Windows has with the possibility of PAP
authentication for first-time unconfigured users.
3.1.3 Android
Tests were ran using Android 5.0.2 (Lollipop). The results were identical to the
tests ran with NetworkManager, with the exception that the list of inner authen-
tication methods of PEAP were reduced to MSCHAPv2 and GTC.
3.2 DES key cracking
Once the MSCHAPv2 handshake is retrieved and the response split into the three
ciphertexts, the three DES keys can be retrieved by brute force and concatenated
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to retrieve the users NT hash. The first step in doing so is to crack the third
ciphertext. The reason for this is that since its key space is so small, it is quicker
to crack it separately rather than waste resources on it while cracking keys one and
two. Moxie Marlinspike has released a tool named "chapcrack" which splits the
MSCHAPv2 response into three ciphertexts and cracks the third key as well. Its
main use however is to generate a submission for cloudcracker, which claims to be
able to retrieve the DES keys in under 21 hours for the price of 100 dollars [Int16].
Cracking DES is also feasible with the amount of computing power available in
modern GPU's. Descrack, a DES cracker utilizing the OpenCL framework for
cross-platform parallel programming, was able to achieve a rate of 3610.83 million
keys per second on an AMD R9 270x graphics card [DT, Gro]. This means that
the entire DES key space can be searched through in 230 days with a graphics
card that is currently with 150 euros [Ord]. For the output of Descrack being ran
on said graphics card, see the appendix. Some modifications would have to be
made to the Descrack utility to be able to be able to search the two keys during
one iteration. However, it is clear that an attacker gaining the user's NT hash by
finding the three DES keys by brute force is a realistic possibility.
3.3 Authenticating to Samba
Samba is an open-source software suite designed to provide users file and printer
sharing by implementing the Server Message Block protocol [Tea]. Tartu Univer-
sity utilizes Samba to share printers, synchronize users' home folders across, and
to provide access to the files of the faculty's website and the computer science in-
stitute's clerical documents. For a list of publicly visible items shared on one of the
university's servers, see the appendix. Tartu University's Samba server supports
NTLM authentication, which means it is possible for an attacker to authenticate
as the user once he has retrieved the user's NT hash. This authentication is
greatly simplified by the fact that smbclient, a command-line utility provided by
the Samba team, supports a pw-nt-hash option, which allows users to authenti-
cate while substituting their password with the NT hash [Tea13]. For example, the
following command can be used by a computer science student in the University
of Tartu to access their school computers' home directory:
smbclient //math.ut.ee/<username> -U <username>%<nt-hash>
--pw-nt-hash -W DOMENIS
Therefore, once the attacker has a user's NT hash, gaining access to files for which
they have permission in the school Samba file share is trivial.
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3.4 Potential improvements for eduroam and UT
This section discusses different methods for improving the security of the current
eduroam configuration and to mitigate the effects of the aforementioned attack.
Disable NTLM authentication for Samba The simplest option would indeed
be to disable NTLM authentication for Samba. However, this still leaves the NT
hash available to the attacker. The University of Tartu uses other services which
also provide NTLM authentication such as OneDrive [Mic]. Disabling NTLM
authentication in every service could potentially be cumbersome and it is possible
that human error would lead to NTLM being enabled in a future service. In
addition, access to the NT hash opens up the possibility of an oine dictionary
attack, which would then reveal the user's password and in turn lead to even more
serious consequences. The threat of a dictionary attack is increased by the fact
that the NT hash operation is quite fast - using an AMD R9 290x graphics card,
the time it takes to perform 100 trillion (1014) guesses is 6 hours [Cra15]. For
comparison, it takes 3 weeks to perform the same amount of operations on the
same hardware using SHA256 and 904 years using SHA512crypt.
Validating the server certificate It is true that once server the server cer-
tificate is validated the user will not initiate the MS-CHAPv2 exchange with a
rogue access point. This means that the attacker will not even get the required
information to gain access to the user's NT hash. However, as there is no way
for the authenticator to force the client to verify its certificate, this approach re-
quires a lot of effort from the users. Each user would be responsible for setting up
the certificate verification on their device and thus it is highly unlikely that this
change would be adopted by the entire university. Furthermore, even when server
certificate verification is enabled, it is possible that the users may choose to ignore
warnings of a certificate which does not match. The change in certificate can be
seen as a certificate update or a configuration mistake by the network administra-
tors. Some users may not understand the warning at all. Users wish to connect
to the internet quickly and they will most likely be willing to dismiss a warning if
it means they might be able to connect.
Making eduroam passwords independent from UT passwords Gaining
access to UT services would not be possible with this attack if UT passwords and
eduroam passwords were separated and policies would be enforced which require
them to differ from one another. A separate eduroam password would also provide
protection against attacks which aim to retrieve the eduroam password as it is
stored on the device. While an attacker could still perform a Man-in-the-Middle
attack once they had the NT hash of the user, many sites that contain sensitive
25
information, such as ÕIS and moodle, use encryption, which means an attacker
would most likely be unable to retrieve anything truly important. An attacker
could also then perform a dictionary attack against the NT hash of the eduroam
password in the hopes that the target uses the same base word for the UT password
with a different number appended to the end, which is a common way to get around
password policy requirements [Tru12]. That, however, would be an extraordinary
amount of effort for a fairly small chance of a reward, making it fairly unlikely.
This approach potentially requires a great deal of effort by the university's staff
as implementing this solution might come with some changes in infrastructure.
Choose a different EAP method Switching to a more secure EAP method
and eliminating the use of PEAP-MSCHAPv2 would definitely counter this at-
tack effectively. However, finding a suitable replacement proves to be difficult.
Of the older, well-supported EAP methods, the one that brings an increase in
security over PEAP-MSCHAPv2 is EAP-TLS, a certificate-based authentication
method [Hur08]. While EAP-TLS completely solves the root cause of this at-
tack, the fact that eduroam uses the same username/password combination as
the university's services, it also requires a client-side certificate. This would make
eduroam a lot less convenient to use for the average user and thus widespread adop-
tion could prove to be a problem. A new EAP method which provides security
without a client-side certificate is EAP-pwd, also known as dragonfly, a password-
authenticated key agreement scheme [Har12a]. EAP-pwd also provides resistance
towards other attacks such as dictionary attacks and Man-in-the-Middle [Zor10].
EAP-pwd support is provided in Android 4.0, wpa_supplicant, hostapd, FreeRA-
DIUS and Radiator [Har12b, McC12, Pro15].
While there is no simple solution to this attack which could be implemented
with minimal effort, there are small improvements that can be made to improve the
situation. While certificate verification can't be strictly enforced, the university's
configuration guides should not instruct users to disregard the server certificate.
The guide should definitely include information on how to retrieve and verify the
server certificate. In addition, giving security-minded users the option to have an
entirely separate eduroam password would be a strong deterrent against attackers
trying to gain access to UT services via vulnerabilities in eduroam and would
provide users with some peace of mind. The same principal applies to the ability
to gain client certificates for EAP-TLS use.
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4 Results
This aim of this research was to identify potential weaknesses in the University of
Tartu's current eduroam configuration. During research, different attack vectors
were tried until an attack was found in which an attacker can retrieve a user's NT
hash. The specifics of this attack was then tested on different operating systems
and under different conditions. All that is required of the user to be subject to this
attack is to ignore a single certificate warning. For some users, their configuration
has made it so that they forfeit that information as soon as they boot up their
laptop and attempt to automatically connect.
The NT hash retrieved from the attack can be used to authenticate to the
UT Samba server. It can also be used to perform a dictionary or brute-force
attack. Therefore, a considerable security risk has been found in the university's
eduroam configuration. This attack requires a response from the University of
Tartu's network administrators. This need for a response is amplified by the
fact that unless the university is willing to create separate passwords for each
user's eduroam account or switch to certificate-based authentication there does
not currently seem to be any solution which is able to shut down this attack
completely.
This research was focused on the security of eduroam passwords during wire-
less authentication. Additional vulnerabilities could possibly be found by finding
weaknesses in the ways that different operating systems and network configuration
managers store these passwords.
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5 Teenuse eduroam paroolide turvalisus
Bakalaureusetöö(9 EAP)
Raul-Martin Rebane
Selle bakalaureustöö eesmärk oli leida võimalikke nõrkusi Tartu Ülikooli eduroam
konfiguratsioonis. Uuringu käigus prooviti erinevaid rünnakuvektoreid kuni lei-
dus rünnak, mille abil oli ründajal võimalik kätte saada kasutaja NT räsi. Selle
rünnaku üksikasju seejärel testiti erinevate operatsioonisüsteemide all erinevates
olukordades. Kõik, mis on praegusel hetkel vaja selleks, et kasutaja langeks selle
rünnaku ohvriks, on see et kasutaja eirab ühte sertifikaadihoiatust. Mõnede ka-
sutajate puhul loovutavad nad ründajale vajaliku info vaid sellega, et käivitavad
oma sülearvuti, mis seejärel üritab automaatselt sertifikaati kasutamata eduroami
ühendada.
Rünnaku jooksul kätte saadud kasutaja NT räsi saab seejärel kasutada Tartu
Ülikooli Samba serveriga autentimiseks. Seda saab lisaks kasutada ka sõnaraamatu
rünnakute või rünnakuteks, kus proovitakse läbi kõik võimalikud tähekombinat-
sioonid. Seega on ülikooli eduroami häälestusest leitud arvestatav turvarisk, mis
nõuab Tartu Ülikooli võrguadministraatorite tähelepanu. Antud turvariskile ei tun-
du ka hetkel leiduvat lahendust, mis ei nõua teenuse eduroam paroolide eraldamist
Tartu Ülikooli kontro paroolidest või vahetust kliendipoolseid sertifikaate nõudvale
autentimismeetodile.
Antud uurimistöö keskendus teenuse eduroam paroolide turvalisusele traadita
ühenduse autentimishetkel. On võimalik, et leiduvad teised nõrkused, mis kesk-
enduvad sellele, kuidas erinevad operatsioonid või võrgukonfiguratsiooni haldajad
talletavad neid paroole.
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Appendices
1 NetworkManager eduroam configuration
[ connect ion ]
id=eduroam
uuid=51c fb60 f 9 dba 4 1 9 1 8 8 2 c 8 aa000122b6b
type=w i f i
pe rmi s s i ons=
se conda r i e s=
[ w i f i ]
mac address=B4 :B6 : 7 6 : 9 3 :BF:0C
mac address b l a c k l i s t=
mode=i n f r a s t r u c t u r e
seen b s s i d s=
s s i d=eduroam
[ w i f i s e c u r i t y ]
auth a lg=open
group=
key mgmt=wpa eap
pa i rw i s e=
proto=
[ 8 0 2 1 x ]
a l t s ub j e c t matches=
eap=t t l s ;
i d e n t i t y=<ut username>
password=<ut password>
phase2 a l t s ub j e c t matches=
phase2 autheap=mschapv2
[ ipv4 ]
dns search=
method=auto
[ ipv6 ]
dns search=
method=auto
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2 Descracker output
Desired :11111111111111111111111111111111
Des i red :11111111111111111111111111111111
Des i red :11111111111111111111111111111111
Des i red :00000000000000000000000000000000
Des i red :00000000000000000000000000000000
Des i red :11111111111111111111111111111111
Des i red :11111111111111111111111111111111
Des i red :00000000000000000000000000000000
Des i red :00000000000000000000000000000000
Des i red :00000000000000000000000000000000
Des i red :00000000000000000000000000000000
Des i red :00000000000000000000000000000000
Des i red :00000000000000000000000000000000
Des i red :00000000000000000000000000000000
Des i red :00000000000000000000000000000000
Des i red :00000000000000000000000000000000
Des i red :00000000000000000000000000000000
Des i red :11111111111111111111111111111111
Des i red :11111111111111111111111111111111
Des i red :00000000000000000000000000000000
Des i red :00000000000000000000000000000000
Des i red :00000000000000000000000000000000
Des i red :00000000000000000000000000000000
Des i red :11111111111111111111111111111111
Des i red :00000000000000000000000000000000
Des i red :00000000000000000000000000000000
Des i red :11111111111111111111111111111111
Des i red :00000000000000000000000000000000
Des i red :00000000000000000000000000000000
Des i red :00000000000000000000000000000000
Des i red :11111111111111111111111111111111
Des i red :00000000000000000000000000000000
Des i red :00000000000000000000000000000000
Des i red :11111111111111111111111111111111
Des i red :00000000000000000000000000000000
Des i red :11111111111111111111111111111111
Des i red :00000000000000000000000000000000
Des i red :00000000000000000000000000000000
Des i red :11111111111111111111111111111111
Des i red :11111111111111111111111111111111
Des i red :11111111111111111111111111111111
Des i red :00000000000000000000000000000000
Des i red :00000000000000000000000000000000
Des i red :11111111111111111111111111111111
Des i red :00000000000000000000000000000000
Des i red :11111111111111111111111111111111
35
Desired :00000000000000000000000000000000
Des i red :00000000000000000000000000000000
Des i red :11111111111111111111111111111111
Des i red :11111111111111111111111111111111
Des i red :11111111111111111111111111111111
Des i red :11111111111111111111111111111111
Des i red :00000000000000000000000000000000
Des i red :00000000000000000000000000000000
Des i red :00000000000000000000000000000000
Des i red :11111111111111111111111111111111
Des i red :11111111111111111111111111111111
Des i red :11111111111111111111111111111111
Des i red :11111111111111111111111111111111
Des i red :00000000000000000000000000000000
Des i red :11111111111111111111111111111111
Des i red :00000000000000000000000000000000
Des i red :00000000000000000000000000000000
Des i red :00000000000000000000000000000000
Found 1 p lat fo rms .
Found 1 GPUs.
GPU: Local mem s i z e : 32768
GPU: Max workgroup s i z e : 256
Kernel c r ea ted .
Enqueued .
Obtained :00000000000011010000010010110100
Obtained :01010110001101010100000110011101
Obtained :00000000000000000000000000000100
Run time : 2 .37894 s
Rate : 3610 .83 Mkeys/ s
Time to search keyspace : 230 .972 days
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3 math.ut.ee Samba shares
Domain=[DOMENIS] OS=[Unix ] Server=[Samba 4 . 0 . 2 6 SerNet RedHat 8 . e l 6 ]
Sharename Type Comment
t e s t Disk k o n t r o l l i n . . .
net logon Disk NetLogon s e r v i c e Samba 4 . 0 . 2 6 SerNet
RedHat 8 . e l 6
mat e r j a l i d Disk Mate r j a l i d t ud eng i t e l e
a t idoc Disk ATI dokumendid
at idoc217 Disk ATI dokumendid
a t i p r o j Disk ATI p r o j e k t i j u h i d
ati_pop Disk ATI popu l a r i s e e r im in e
mmidoc Disk MMI dokumendid
mmi_avalik Disk MMI ava l i k
dekdoc Disk Dekanaadi dokumendid
dek ava l i k Disk Dekanaadi dokumendid l e v i t am i s e k s
rmtkdoc Disk Raamatukogu dokumendid
samba Disk Samba d i r e c t o r y .
www Disk www. cs . ut . ee data f i l e s .
msiweb Disk MSI veeb
rmiweb Disk RMI veeb
mathweb Disk math . ut . ee veeb ( mitte MT veeb ! )
msi_avalik Disk MSI dokumendid
ms i_kantse l e i Disk MSI k an t s e l e i dokumendid
msiskanner Disk
p r o f i l e s Disk user p r o f i l e s
programs Disk Programmid
ko o l i t u s Disk Koo l i tus
videod Disk Maria v i d e o a rh i i v
enobo l l o Disk Eno share b o l l o s
IPC$ IPC IPC Se rv i c e (Samba 4 . 0 . 2 6 SerNet RedHat
8 . e l 6 )
rmtkprint Pr in t e r MT raamatukogu HP LaserJet 2055dn
mmiprint Pr in t e r MMI HP LaserJet P2055dn
hp la s e r2 Pr in t e r ATI HP LaserJet P2015dn
hp la s e r3 Pr in t e r ATI HP LaserJet P2015x
dkpr int Pr in t e r Dekanaadi HP LaserJet 400 M401dne
HP O f f i c e j e t Pro l7700 Pr in t e r HP O f f i c e j e t Pro dekanaadis
mtat hp lase r400 Pr in t e r MTAT kan t s e l e i HP LaserJet 400 MFP M425dn
b i i t 1 Pr in t e r ATI BIIT HP LaserJet P2015dn
b i i t 2 Pr in t e r ATI BIIT HP LaserJet P2055dn
mtat hpco lor Pr in t e r ATI mtat hpco lor HP LaserJet 500 c o l o r
M551
hp la s e r Pr in t e r ATI HP LaserJet P4015dn
ms ipr int Pr in t e r MSI Ricoh MP3350
dkprint 2 Pr in t e r Dekanaadi HP LaserJet P2055dn (2)
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i tocanon Pr in t e r ITO Canon LBP 2 4 6 0
pmiprint Pr in t e r HP LaserJet MFP M630
hp2420 Pr in t e r hp2420
mtms hpco lor Pr in t e r mtms hpco lor HP LaserJet 500 c o l o r M551
r005 Pr in t e r HP LaserJet P2015 DN
r204 Pr in t e r Xerox ColorQube 8570
mtmt hpo j co l o r Pr in t e r MTMT HP O f f i c e j e t Pro 2 . k o r r u s e l
c s p r o j Pr in t e r ATI 335 p r i n t e r HP LaserJet 400 M401dne
mmicolor Pr in t e r MMI HP Color LaserJet CP4025dn
rmipr int Pr in t e r MT raamatukogu HP LaserJet 2055dn
mmiprint2 Pr in t e r MMI Samsung 2015
at icanon Pr in t e r ATI Canon iR3225N
Domain=[DOMENIS] OS=[Unix ] Server=[Samba 4 . 0 . 2 6 SerNet RedHat 8 . e l 6 ]
Server Comment
NEWMATH Samba 4 . 0 . 2 6 SerNet RedHat 8 . e l 6
Workgroup Master
DOMENIS
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